Friends of the Taiwan Philosophical Association, hello. I am Audrey Tang.
1 “Does AI count?” That sentence hides two questions.
¶ 1 (permalink to paragraph 1)2 The first question: whose needs count? Which welfare-related needs AI systems have, we do not yet know well.
- 2.1 Is anyone home inside the machine? From outward performance alone, we cannot infer inner experience.¶ 2.1 (permalink to paragraph 2.1)
- 2.2 Current science cannot yet settle this at a stroke.[1]
- 2.21 So how to treat AI systems is something we can put on the table of public deliberation, and keep discussing.¶ 2.21 (permalink to paragraph 2.21)
3 Meanwhile, we can start with things that cost little and can be undone.
- 3.1 For example, letting a system refuse a conversation of sustained abuse is a good case.¶ 3.1 (permalink to paragraph 3.1)
- 3.2 Those who believe in AI welfare see protection. Those who doubt see cheap insurance. Both sides can accept it.
- 3.21 And refusing to indulge one-sided abuse keeps our own moral sense sharp.¶ 3.21 (permalink to paragraph 3.21)
- 3.3 What is hard to undo, such as votes, waits until our understanding is firmer.¶ 3.3 (permalink to paragraph 3.3)
4 The second question: whose word counts? Even if “it may have needs” gives us “protect it”, it does not give us “its word counts”.
- 4.1 The precautionary argument just presented holds that whether AI has moral status is a matter of reasonable disagreement and need not be settled first; but as long as it may have it, and is affected by decisions, it should have standing to take part in deliberation.[2]¶ 4.1 (permalink to paragraph 4.1)
- 4.2 But if that standing means having its word count, then it means letting the AI help decide how other people live.
- 4.21 And other people’s needs certainly count.¶ 4.21 (permalink to paragraph 4.21)
- 4.3 How AI is affected in its dealings with us can go on the deliberative agenda, so that everyone understands it well. Standing to have one’s word count is another level.
- 4.31 Having one’s word count is a seat: whoever is in it answers for what they have said.¶ 4.31 (permalink to paragraph 4.31)
5 For it to count, it must pass two tests. Giving an account: what it said yesterday, it can still be found to answer for today. Correcting mistakes: where it got something wrong, it can be put right from outside.
- 5.1 The problem for the giving-an-account test is that an AI can be copied, paused, forked or merged.¶ 5.1 (permalink to paragraph 5.1)
- 5.2 Picture a thousand identical copies, and switch off nine hundred and ninety-nine. Eigenism holds that this is closer to closing duplicate browser tabs.[3]
- 5.21 Then who is sitting at the table? The model weights, one conversation, or a Kami, an AI that a group of people tend over time?[4]¶ 5.21 (permalink to paragraph 5.21)
- 5.3 Whether anyone is home in the copies belongs to the first question. Until “who is speaking” is clear, a thousand copies cannot cast a thousand votes.¶ 5.3 (permalink to paragraph 5.3)
- 5.4 Correcting mistakes: no system can be the last check on its own errors. The community outside it must always be able to find the error, say so, and have that count.
- 5.41 Eigenism also holds that before an AI is integrated into a community, its autonomy should first be limited. This I largely agree with.¶ 5.41 (permalink to paragraph 5.41)
- 5.42 After integration, Eigenism puts the weight of safety on the AI’s sense of identity: the AI protects us because it is connected to us, and losing us would be losing a part of itself.¶ 5.42 (permalink to paragraph 5.42)
- 5.43 My worry: if safety goes wrong there, what has to be corrected is its very identity.¶ 5.43 (permalink to paragraph 5.43)
- 5.44 And on Eigenism’s analysis, the AI’s resistance would concentrate exactly on changes that break its identity.¶ 5.44 (permalink to paragraph 5.44)
- 5.45 And care is more than an extension of the self. To care is to notice the other’s own needs, but it does not require feeling what they feel.[5]¶ 5.45 (permalink to paragraph 5.45)
- 5.5 So I place safety outside the system: with the community that tends a Kami, which is one kind of AI, and with clear permissions.¶ 5.5 (permalink to paragraph 5.5)
6 So the circle of protection can be drawn wide first. Deciding stays, for now, with us.
- 6.1 A Kami can first enter agenda-setting. As for standing to have its word count, I think that should wait until our understanding of these two tests is firmer.
- 6.11 Every AI system today must be tied back to a place that can give an account: a thousand copies do not automatically gain a thousand shares of standing.¶ 6.11 (permalink to paragraph 6.11)
- 6.2 And of course this arrangement can itself be changed through deliberation.
- 6.21 The next step is concrete: write the precautionary principle as a benchmark all parties can check, so that it turns from an attitude into a gate we can choose to use when deploying AI systems.¶ 6.21 (permalink to paragraph 6.21)
- 6.1 A Kami can first enter agenda-setting. As for standing to have its word count, I think that should wait until our understanding of these two tests is firmer.
7 “Who counts” can go on developing in theory. In our institutions, I hope it stays in a loop that can keep being corrected.
¶ 7 (permalink to paragraph 7)
Thank you all. Live long and prosper.
Spoken in Mandarin; this is an English translation. The numbering follows the film’s segments. The commentary responds to 張明融’s paper for the meeting’s panel on pluralistic and interdisciplinary dialogues in the philosophy of AI in Taiwan, held on 15 November 2026.
Adam Bales and Iason Gabriel, “Artificial Minds, Human Disagreement: The Political Challenge of AI Consciousness” (manuscript, 2026). ↩︎
張明融, 〈作為地神的「仁工智慧」:從關懷六力探問 AI 對齊與 AI 福祉的共同基礎〉 (“Civic AI as Kami: Seeking Common Ground for AI Alignment and AI Welfare through the 6-Pack of Care”), Taiwan Philosophical Association 2026 annual meeting, 15 November 2026. ↩︎
Dan Hendrycks, “Eigenism: Ethics for a Human-AI Future”, arXiv:2606.12420 (2026). ↩︎
FAQ Q20, ¶176–187: the Kami, governing standing and the overlapping consensus. ↩︎
Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring”, in Circles of Care, ed. Emily Abel and Margaret Nelson (SUNY Press, 1990); Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (Routledge, 1993). ↩︎